Judiciary and Legal System

• Option (c) is correct. Article 131 confers on the Supreme Court exclusive original jurisdiction in any dispute between the Government of India and one or more States, between the Government of India and any State on one side and one or more other States on the other, or between two or more States, provided the dispute involves a question on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends. Exclusive means that no other court may entertain such a dispute, and original means that it comes to the Supreme Court at first instance rather than on appeal.
• Option (a) is incorrect: advisory jurisdiction arises under Article 143, where the President refers a question of law or fact of public importance for the Court's opinion, which is not binding.
• Option (b) is incorrect: appellate jurisdiction under Articles 132 to 134 and 136 requires a decision of a High Court or tribunal to appeal from, and a federal dispute has no such prior decision.
• Option (d) is incorrect and is the sharpest distractor because writ jurisdiction under Article 32 is also original, but it is confined to the enforcement of Fundamental Rights, which a State as such cannot claim. The discriminator between (c) and (d) is therefore the subject matter, federal dispute against Fundamental Rights, not the stage at which the Court is approached.

• Option (b) is correct. Article 124(1) provides that there shall be a Supreme Court consisting of a Chief Justice of India and, until Parliament by law prescribes a larger number, of not more than seven other judges. The words until Parliament by law prescribes a larger number are the whole of the answer: the Constitution fixed a floor and left the strength to be increased by ordinary legislation, which Parliament has done repeatedly through the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Act, 1956 and its amendments.
• Option (a) is incorrect and is the natural error, since the President appoints the judges under Article 124(2), but appointing individuals to sanctioned posts is different from creating the posts.
• Option (c) is incorrect: the Chief Justice is consulted in appointments and, since the Second Judges case, the collegium's recommendation is determinative in practice, but the Chief Justice cannot enlarge the sanctioned strength; the Chief Justice's role here is to press for an increase, not to effect one.
• Option (d) is incorrect: the Law Commission is a non-statutory advisory body that can recommend but not enact. The governing distinction is between the power to create a post by law and the power to fill it by appointment.

• Option (d) is correct. The Supreme Court is the custodian and final interpreter of the Constitution: it exercises judicial review over legislative and executive action, enforces fundamental rights under Article 32, which Ambedkar called the heart and soul of the Constitution, decides disputes between the Union and the States under Article 131, and holds under the basic structure doctrine of Kesavananda Bharati that even the amending power in Article 368 cannot destroy the Constitution's essential features.
• Option (a) is wrong on a distinction worth holding: the President takes an oath under Article 60 to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution, which is a duty of office, but custodianship in the sense of authoritative protection through interpretation is judicial, and the President acts on ministerial advice.
• Option (b) is wrong: the Prime Minister heads the political executive, whose acts are themselves subject to review.
• Option (c) is wrong: the Lok Sabha Secretariat is an administrative body serving the House. The governing principle is that in a Constitution with an enforceable bill of rights and a written distribution of powers, custodianship necessarily rests with the organ empowered to strike down what is inconsistent with it.

• Statement 1 is incorrect. The Gram Nyayalayas Act, 2008 confers both civil and criminal jurisdiction on these courts. Each Gram Nyayalaya is presided over by a Nyayadhikari holding the rank of a judicial magistrate of the first class, and the schedules to the Act specify the criminal offences triable and the civil disputes cognisable, the criminal jurisdiction covering offences punishable with up to two years' imprisonment. Restricting them to civil matters would defeat the object of taking justice to the doorstep of rural litigants, most of whose disputes are petty criminal as much as civil.
• Statement 2 is correct. The Act directs the Gram Nyayalaya to make efforts at conciliation and settlement, and provides for the appointment of conciliators for that purpose, drawn from persons of repute in the locality, which is what the statement describes as local social activists acting as mediators or reconciliators. Hence (b).
• Options (a) and (c) fail on the civil-only claim, and (d) fails because the conciliation machinery is express in the statute. The eliminating consideration is that the Nyayadhikari holds magisterial rank, which is a criminal judicial office, so a purely civil jurisdiction would be inconsistent with the design of the court itself.

• Option (a) is correct. Judicial review is the power of the courts to examine the constitutionality of legislative enactments and executive orders and to declare them void to the extent of any inconsistency. Its textual foundations lie in Article 13, which renders void any law inconsistent with the Fundamental Rights, in Articles 32 and 226 conferring the writ jurisdictions, and in Articles 131 to 136 and 246 with the Seventh Schedule, and it has been held a basic feature of the Constitution and therefore beyond the amending power.
• Option (b) is wrong and states the settled limit of the doctrine: the courts examine legislative competence and constitutional validity, not legislative wisdom, so a law that is unwise but constitutional stands, and the distinction between constitutionality and policy is the discipline the doctrine imposes on the judiciary itself.
• Option (c) is wrong because Indian courts exercise review after enactment and only in an actual case or controversy; there is no general power of pre enactment scrutiny, the sole route by which the executive may seek a prior opinion being the President's reference under Article 143, which is advisory.
• Option (d) is wrong because reconsideration by a court of its own decisions is the review jurisdiction under Article 137, an entirely different power, and the resemblance of the words is the trap. Governing principle: judicial review looks outward at the acts of the other branches, whereas review under Article 137 looks inward at the court's own judgments.

• Statement 1 is incorrect, and it inverts the historical record in a way that is worth holding precisely. It was the 39th Amendment of 1975, enacted during the Emergency in the aftermath of the Allahabad High Court judgment against Indira Gandhi, that inserted Article 329A to place the election of the Prime Minister and the Speaker beyond the reach of the courts. The Supreme Court struck down the relevant clause in Indira Nehru Gandhi versus Raj Narain as violating the basic structure. The 44th Amendment of 1978, enacted by the Janata government, did the opposite: it repealed Article 329A along with the other Emergency era provisions, restored safeguards on the proclamation of Emergency and removed the right to property from the Fundamental Rights.
• Statement 2 is correct. In the Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association case of 2015 the Court struck down the 99th Amendment and the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act as violative of the independence of the judiciary, a basic feature, and restored the collegium system. Since only statement 2 holds, the official answer (b) follows. The governing distinction is that the 39th Amendment was the assault on judicial review and the 44th was the restoration, and a candidate who fixes the 44th Amendment as the corrective, undoing amendment can reject statement 1 without recalling Article 329A by number.

• Statement 1 is incorrect. Under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 the presiding officer of the House in which the motion is moved has the discretion to admit or refuse to admit it, and only on admission is an inquiry committee constituted. This discretion was exercised in April 2018 when the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha declined to admit the removal motion against the sitting Chief Justice, which is almost certainly why the examiner framed the statement.
• Statement 2 is incorrect. The Constitution uses the expressions proved misbehaviour and incapacity in Article 124(4) but nowhere defines them; the absence of definition is a standing criticism of the removal machinery.
• Statement 3 is correct. Article 124(5) empowers Parliament to regulate the procedure for investigation and proof, and the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 is the statute enacted under it, laying down the admission of the motion, the three member inquiry committee and the framing of charges.
• Statement 4 is correct and reproduces the special majority of Article 124(4), namely a majority of the total membership of the House together with not less than two thirds of the members present and voting, required in each House in the same session. Since statements 3 and 4 hold, the official answer (c) follows. The item is difficult because there is no elimination route; each of the four statements must be judged independently.

Article 142 empowers the Supreme Court to pass any decree or order necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it. The proposition in the stem is that ordinary statutory law cannot cut down this constitutional power, and the only option that restates that proposition is (b), which says the Court is not constrained in the exercise of its powers by laws made by Parliament.

• Option (a) is wrong because it concerns the Election Commission, a different body altogether, and in any case the Commission's decisions are amenable to judicial review; nothing in Article 142 confers immunity on anyone.
• Option (c) is wrong because a Financial Emergency under Article 360 is proclaimed by the President on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, and Article 142 has no bearing on executive emergency powers.
• Option (d) is wrong because it describes the federal legislative scheme under Articles 246 to 254, which is unrelated to the Supreme Court's remedial jurisdiction. The item requires no external recall at all. It is a comprehension question in which the stem states a principle and the candidate must identify its restatement, and the discipline it tests is reading the stem for its subject, which is the Supreme Court and no other institution.

• Statement 1 is incorrect. High Courts exercise the power of judicial review under Article 226 and, on the constitutional validity of legislation, as courts of record within the ordinary hierarchy, and they may and regularly do declare a central law unconstitutional. Such a declaration is subject to appeal to the Supreme Court, but the jurisdiction itself is not denied to them. The power of judicial review of legislation is itself part of the basic structure, so it could not be taken away from the High Courts even by amendment, as the Court held when striking down the attempt to exclude High Court jurisdiction over tribunals in Chandra Kumar.
• Statement 2 is incorrect. Constitutional amendments are open to challenge before the Supreme Court on the ground that they violate the basic structure of the Constitution, the doctrine laid down in Kesavananda Bharati in 1973 and applied since to strike down amendments in Indira Nehru Gandhi, Minerva Mills, Chandra Kumar, Coelho and the 99th Amendment case. Since both statements fail, the official answer (d) follows. The organising principle is that judicial review in India extends to ordinary legislation, to executive action and to constitutional amendments themselves, and a candidate who holds that three fold reach will reject both statements without needing case names.

Section 12 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 lists the entitled categories, which include members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, victims of trafficking, women and children, persons with disability, victims of mass disaster and violence, industrial workmen, persons in custody, and persons whose annual income falls below the ceiling prescribed by the appropriate government.

• Statement 4 is clearly incorrect, since senior citizens are not entitled as a class merely by age and must satisfy a means or category test, and this eliminates (b) and (d).
• Statement 3 is incorrect because Other Backward Classes are not a listed category and no OBC specific income ceiling exists in the Act, which eliminates (c). By elimination the answer is (a), which rests on a general low income ceiling and on transgender persons being covered following the NALSA judgment of 2014 and subsequent legal services schemes.

• Statement 1 is incorrect and inverts the position: in judicial custody the accused is committed to jail under the authority of the magistrate, whereas confinement in a police station lock up is police custody. The statement correctly identifies whose custody it is and then attaches the wrong place of detention.
• Statement 2 is correct: once an accused is in judicial custody the investigating officer loses the free access he enjoys during police custody, and interrogation requires the permission of the court, which is the substantive protection the distinction exists to provide. Hence (b). The rationale is worth teaching alongside Article 22 and Section 167 of the Criminal Procedure Code: police custody is capped at fifteen days precisely because proximity to the investigating agency creates the risk of coercion, and judicial custody removes the accused from that proximity.

• Statement 1 is incorrect: parole is a discretionary concession, not an enforceable right, and even where a prisoner makes out a strong case the competent authority may refuse it on grounds such as the security of the state, the likelihood of the prisoner absconding or interfering with witnesses, or the gravity of the offence. The courts have consistently held that no prisoner can claim parole as a matter of right.
• Statement 2 is correct: prisons are a State subject under Entry 4 of the State List, so each State frames its own Prisoners Release on Parole Rules, which is why eligibility conditions, duration and the sanctioning authority differ across States. Hence (b). The federal point in statement 2 is the more useful one for the examination, since it recurs whenever prison administration, police reform or public order arises.

• Statement 1 is correct: Article 128 empowers the Chief Justice of India, with the previous consent of the President and of the person concerned, to request any person who has held office as a judge of the Supreme Court or of the Federal Court to sit and act as a judge of the Supreme Court, and such a person enjoys all the jurisdiction and privileges of a judge without being deemed one for other purposes.
• Statement 2 is treated as incorrect on a precise textual ground: Article 137 expressly confers on the Supreme Court the power to review its own judgements, and there is no corresponding express provision for High Courts, whose review power rests on the Code of Civil Procedure and inherent jurisdiction rather than on a constitutional grant. The phrase as the Supreme Court does is therefore what makes the statement fail. Hence (a). This is a fine distinction and the item is legitimately difficult, since High Courts do in practice exercise review.

• Statement 1 is correct. The H.N. Sanyal Committee, set up in 1961, examined the unsatisfactory state of the law of contempt and its recommendations led to the enactment of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
• Statement 2 is correct. Article 129 declares the Supreme Court a court of record with power to punish for contempt of itself, and Article 215 makes the identical provision for the High Courts.
• Statement 3 is incorrect and is the discriminating statement. The Constitution nowhere defines contempt; the twofold classification into civil contempt, meaning wilful disobedience of a judgment or undertaking, and criminal contempt, meaning scandalising the court or interfering with the administration of justice, is supplied by Section 2 of the 1971 Act.
• Statement 4 is correct. Parliament's competence flows from Entry 77 of the Union List read with Entry 14 of the Concurrent List, and Article 142(2) also contemplates law made by Parliament on contempt of the Supreme Court.
• Statements 1, 2 and 4 being correct, (b) is the answer.
• Options (c) and (d) rest on the false statement 3, and (a) drops the correct statement 4.

• Statement 1 is incorrect. The scheme of the Advocates Act, 1961 and the Bar Council of India Rules does not draw the line the statement describes. Recognition as an advocate turns on enrolment with a State Bar Council, which is open to individuals meeting the prescribed qualifications; a legal firm as an entity is not itself enrolled as an advocate. Conversely, Rule 49 of the Bar Council of India Rules bars a full time salaried employee from practising as an advocate for so long as the employment continues, which cuts against, rather than supports, the claim that government law officers are recognised while corporate lawyers are categorically excluded. The statement is therefore wrong on both halves.
• Statement 2 is correct. Section 7 of the Advocates Act charges the Bar Council of India with promoting legal education and laying down standards of legal education in consultation with the universities, and with recognising universities whose degree in law shall qualify a person for enrolment, which is the power to recognise law colleges for that purpose. Only statement 2 stands, giving (b).
• Options (a) and (c) admit the false statement 1, and (d) rejects the sound statement 2.

• Statement 1 is correct and is uncontroversial. Mandamus commands the performance of a public duty, so it does not lie against a purely private body; where a private organisation has been entrusted with a public function or duty, the writ becomes available in respect of that function.
• Statement 2 is treated as correct by the official key. The proposition reproduces a classical formulation found in standard constitutional law texts, which list among the grounds on which mandamus does not lie the case of a company, even a government company, on the reasoning that the relationship rests on contract rather than on a statutory public duty.
• Statement 3 is correct. Quo warranto is an exception to the general rule of locus standi; because the writ questions the very title to a public office, any member of the public may move the court even though he has suffered no personal injury. All three statements being taken as correct, (d) follows, and options (a), (b) and (c) each drop a statement the key treats as sound.

• Pair 1 is correct. Section 6 of the Official Secrets Act of 1923 penalises unauthorised use of uniforms, along with falsification of reports, forgery and personation, these being treated as means of gaining unauthorised access to prohibited places.
• Pair 2 is incorrect, and this is the discriminator. Knowingly misleading or interfering with a police or military officer engaged in duty is also dealt with under Section 6 of the Official Secrets Act, not under the Indian Evidence Act of 1872, which is a procedural statute governing what may be proved and how, and creates no such offence.
• Pair 3 is correct. The Arms Amendment Act of 2019 inserted a provision making celebratory gunfire that endangers human life or the personal safety of others a punishable offence, a response to deaths at weddings and festivities. Two pairs match, giving (b).

Prohibition is a judicial writ issued by a superior court to an inferior court or tribunal, forbidding it from continuing proceedings in a matter over which it has no jurisdiction or in which it is exceeding its jurisdiction. It lies only against judicial and quasi judicial bodies, and it is preventive, issued while proceedings are pending, which distinguishes it from certiorari, which quashes an order already made.

• Option (a) is wrong because a direction restraining an executive officer would ordinarily be sought by injunction or under Article 226 generally, not by prohibition, which does not lie against administrative authorities acting administratively.
• Option (b) is wrong because the writ has nothing to do with prohibition in the sense of liquor policy, and courts cannot direct a legislature to enact a law.
• Option (d) is wrong because a challenge to an unconstitutional policy proceeds by declaration or by mandamus and certiorari, not by prohibition.

Only statement 2 is correct, so (d) is the answer. Section 173 of the BNSS permits the officer in charge, for offences punishable with three years or more but less than seven years, to conduct a preliminary enquiry within fourteen days with the prior permission of an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, in order to establish whether a prima facie case exists.

• Statement 1 is incorrect because of the phrase cognizable slash non-cognizable. The statutory provision extends to information relating to a cognizable offence irrespective of the area where it was committed, and the non-cognizable category follows a different route requiring a magistrate's order, so extending the Zero FIR to it misstates the law.
• Statement 3 is incorrect because electronic furnishing of information is an option offered by the statute and not an obligation, and where it is used the informant must sign the record within three days. (a) and (c) accept the jurisdictional overreach and (a) and (b) accept the electronic compulsion.