Policies of Developed and Developing Countries and India's Interests

The West Asian war of February 2026 pushed Brent crude from $80 to $120 and disrupted the Strait of Hormuz. India imports over 85 per cent of its crude, and nine tenths of its cooking gas crosses that strait.

What cooperation with West Asia rests on

Crude supply: Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are among India's largest suppliers. Their volumes rose again in 2026 as Russian flows turned uncertain.

Long term gas: The contract with QatarEnergy, extended in 2024 for twenty years, anchors much of India's imported gas.

Storage and investment: ADNOC stores crude in India's strategic reserve at Mangalore, which turns a seller into a stakeholder.

Investment both ways: Gulf funds have looked at Indian refining and renewables, while Indian firms hold stakes in Gulf fields.

Payment and trade links: The India UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement of 2022 and rupee settlement cut the cost of the trade.

Beyond oil: Green hydrogen and solar tie ups, and the India Middle East Europe Economic Corridor, extend cooperation past oil.

Why it is not enough

Concentration of risk: One strait carries most of these cargoes, so a single conflict raises both the import bill and the price of a cylinder.

Rival ties: Gulf states sell to China on similar terms, and India has no voice in OPEC production decisions.

Diversification and cushions: India has widened sourcing to Russia, the United States, Africa and Guyana, though its strategic reserve covers only a few days.

Energy security is the floor on which growth stands, and West Asia remains its largest pillar. Deeper Gulf partnership must be paired with diversified sourcing and a larger reserve.

Decode

Analyse cooperation with West Asia. The opening statement on energy security frames the answer but is not the question itself.

Implicit demand

Analysis means showing both what the partnership delivers and where it exposes India, with the current disruption as evidence.

Architecture

A hook from the war and the price move → six strands of cooperation → the risks that remain → verdict pairing partnership with diversification.

Articulation

Anchor: crude from $80 to $120, nine tenths of cooking gas through Hormuz, the Qatar gas contract, ADNOC storage at Mangalore, the India UAE trade agreement. Money line: energy security is the floor on which growth stands.

The dependence in numbers

India imports over 85 per cent of its crude oil and about half its natural gas.

West Asia supplied roughly three fifths of India's crude before 2022, and its share fell as discounted Russian barrels arrived.

Russian crude peaked above half of India's imports in July 2026 and fell back as sanctions and attacks on ports cut supply.

About ninety per cent of India's liquefied petroleum gas imports pass through the Strait of Hormuz.

The Strategic Petroleum Reserve holds about 5.33 million tonnes at Visakhapatnam, Mangalore and Padur, with more planned.

Institutional links with the Gulf

The India UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, in force since May 2022, covers energy, trade and investment.

The India Saudi Strategic Partnership Council, set up in 2019, has a committee on economy and investment.

I2U2 with Israel, the United Arab Emirates and the United States works on food and clean energy projects.

India has invested in Iran's Chabahar port, though sanctions have limited its energy dimension.

Around nine million Indians work in the Gulf, which links energy ties to remittances and to the safety of citizens.

Beyond West Asia

The International Solar Alliance and the green hydrogen mission aim to cut import dependence over the long run.

Ethanol blending in petrol reached twenty per cent ahead of schedule, saving foreign exchange.

Long term contracts with the United States for liquefied natural gas and equity stakes in Russia and Africa spread the risk.

Membership of the International Energy Agency as an association country gives access to collective emergency response.

Electrification of transport and public transport investment reduce oil intensity of growth over time.

Russia, China and Turkey hold ground in Central Asia, while India lacks a land route through Pakistan. Joining the Ashgabat Agreement in 2018 was an attempt to enter by sea.

What accession gives India

A route avoiding Pakistan: The corridor links the Gulf to Central Asia through Iran and Turkmenistan.

Synergy with other corridors: It dovetails with the North South corridor and the port of Chabahar.

Access to resources: Connectivity supports uranium from Kazakhstan and the minerals pact signed with Uzbekistan in 2026.

Why it has not delivered

The Iran route is blocked: The American waiver for Chabahar lapsed in April 2026, and war has disrupted shipping since February.

Others are far ahead: India's trade with the region is about $2 billion, against tens of billions for China.

The agreement gave India a doorway, not a working road. Until Iran is secure, the eastern corridor through Kazakhstan and steady resource diplomacy must carry the relationship.

Decode

Discuss the implications of joining the agreement, set against the presence of other powers. Both halves must appear.

Implicit demand

The examiner wants the connectivity logic, not a survey of Central Asia, and an honest assessment of what has actually moved since 2018.

Architecture

A hook naming the rival powers → four implications → two reasons the promise is unrealised → verdict.

Articulation

Anchor: accession in February 2018, the North South corridor, Chabahar and the lapsed waiver, the Uzbekistan minerals agreement of August 2026. Money line: the agreement gave India a legal doorway, not a working road.

The agreement and the corridors

The Ashgabat Agreement was signed in 2011 by Iran, Oman, Qatar, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, with Kazakhstan and Pakistan joining later and India acceding on 3 February 2018.

The International North South Transport Corridor, begun in 2000 by India, Iran and Russia, runs 7,200 kilometres to Russia and carried about 27 million tonnes in 2024.

Its western branch still lacks the 162 kilometre Rasht to Astara railway in Iran, which is unlikely before 2030.

The eastern branch through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan works, and a test run in November 2025 moved containers from Moscow to Tehran in twelve days.

India signed a ten year contract in May 2024 to operate the Shahid Beheshti terminal at Chabahar, with $120 million of equipment investment.

The United States revoked the sanctions waiver for Chabahar with effect from September 2025, and a limited extension expired in April 2026.

The other powers

Russia retains security primacy through the Collective Security Treaty Organisation and the Eurasian Economic Union.

China has built pipelines, roads and rail under the Belt and Road Initiative, and holds its own summit with the five republics.

Turkey works through the Organisation of Turkic States, and the Gulf states invest in energy and real estate.

The United States runs a consultative format with the five republics and seeks critical minerals.

India's trade with the region is around $2 billion, far behind China's, which runs into tens of billions.

India's own instruments

The India Central Asia Dialogue at foreign minister level met for the fourth time in New Delhi in June 2025, with a rare earths forum agreed.

The first India Central Asia Summit was held in January 2022, and the promised biennial summit has since slipped.

India is a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, whose summit met at Bishkek in the autumn of 2026.

Development partnership includes lines of credit, the India Central Asia development group and training under technical cooperation.

Security interests include Afghanistan, terrorism and narcotics, and the air base at Farkhor in Tajikistan.

Uranium from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan supports the target of 100 gigawatts of nuclear capacity by 2047.

India once led the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) and spoke for the decolonising world at Bandung. It now sits in the Quad and signs trade agreements with the wealthiest economies.

What supports the statement

Alignment has changed shape: Strategic autonomy has replaced non alignment, and India signs defence logistics agreements with the United States.

The old platform has faded: The Prime Minister has not attended recent NAM summits, which once carried India's moral claim.

Interest leads the agenda: Trade agreements with the Emirates, Australia and Britain show diplomacy organised around market access.

Positions read as realpolitik: Abstentions on Ukraine were defended on energy and defence grounds rather than on principle.

What cuts against it

The constituency is still claimed: India has hosted the Voice of Global South Summit since 2023, speaking for the same group in new language.

Delivery replaced declaration: Vaccine supplies during the pandemic and disaster relief in the region built standing through action.

A concrete win: India's presidency secured permanent membership of the Group of Twenty (G20) for the African Union in 2023.

The old demands continue: India hosted the BRICS summit in September 2026, and its declaration pressed for reformed multilateralism.

Climate equity: Common but differentiated responsibility remains India's position in every climate negotiation.

The vocabulary has shifted from solidarity to partnership. Leadership is now claimed through delivery rather than through opposition to the West. The image has been recast rather than lost.

Decode

Elaborate a claim. State the case for it, then test it against what India still does.

Implicit demand

The claim is half right, so the answer must separate changed method from changed constituency.

Architecture

Then and now → what supports the statement → what cuts against it → verdict.

Articulation

Anchor: NAM and Bandung, the Quad, the Voice of Global South Summit, the African Union in the G20. Money line: the vocabulary shifted from solidarity to partnership.

The older role

India shaped the Bandung Conference of 1955 and the founding of NAM in 1961.

It led the Group of 77 in demanding a new international economic order.

Opposition to apartheid in South Africa was a defining position for decades.

Support for Palestinian statehood was among the earliest such positions taken by a large state.

Technical cooperation through ITEC has trained officials from developing countries since 1964.

The newer role

Quad membership and the logistics agreements with the United States mark the change most visibly.

Comprehensive economic agreements were concluded with the Emirates, Australia and Britain.

India Middle East Europe Economic Corridor places India inside a western connectivity project.

The Voice of Global South Summit has been held annually since 2023.

Vaccine Maitri supplied doses to dozens of countries during the pandemic.

The International Solar Alliance and the Global Biofuels Alliance were both launched from India.

The debate

Critics argue that a seat at the high table has muted India's criticism of the powerful.

Defenders reply that capability, not rhetoric, is what the Global South now wants from India.

The shift from aid recipient to development partner changed the language of engagement.

India frames its offer as development partnership without conditionality, unlike western aid.

Comparison with China's lending is the test most partner countries actually apply.

Washington's own language has softened. The National Security Strategy of December 2025 treats China as a problem of economic rebalancing. The defence strategy of January 2026 puts the homeland first, and two summits between the presidents have produced a rolling tariff truce.

The challenge is nevertheless deeper than the Soviet one. Moscow was militarily strong but economically separate, so containment cost little. China is the workshop of the world, processes about nine tenths of rare earths, and sits inside the supply chains of the very firms expected to outcompete it.

Existential is still the wrong word. Nuclear deterrence caps the conflict, the two economies are hostage to each other, and the truce extended again in September 2026 shows that both governments prefer management to rupture.

The threat is to American primacy, not to American survival. That is harder to answer than the Soviet threat, because it cannot be contained without cost to the container.

Decode

Explain a strong claim. Explaining includes testing the word existential rather than accepting it.

Implicit demand

The comparison with the Soviet Union is the heart of the question, and the answer must show why economic entanglement makes this rivalry harder.

Architecture

Written as prose because it is a single argument. Current American framing → why the challenge runs deeper → why existential overstates it → verdict.

Articulation

Anchor: the strategies of December 2025 and January 2026, rare earth processing, the tariff truce extended in September 2026. Money line: the threat is to American primacy, not to American survival.

The state of the rivalry

The Busan meeting of October 2025 cut average American tariffs on Chinese goods from 57 to 47 per cent and suspended a Chinese rare earth licensing regime.

Trump visited Beijing in May 2026, and Xi made a state visit to Washington in September 2026, the first by a Chinese leader in eleven years.

The truce has been extended in short instalments, most recently by two months in September 2026.

Effective tariffs remain high on both sides, at about 36 per cent American and 31 per cent Chinese.

Export controls on advanced chips continue, with limited approvals for mid range processors.

Why the comparison with the Soviet Union matters

Soviet trade with the United States was negligible, so sanctions and containment carried little domestic cost.

China is the largest trading partner of most countries in Asia and a major holder of American debt.

China controls the processing of rare earths and much of the battery and solar supply chain.

The contest is technological rather than ideological, which makes alliances harder to organise around values.

Chinese military modernisation is concentrated in its own region, which raises the cost of American presence there.

What it means for India

American strategy documents of 2025 and 2026 give the Indo Pacific less prominence, which allies read as a signal.

The Quad has not met at leaders' level since 2024, and India has held the chair without convening a summit.

A softer American line on China reduces the value placed on India as a balancing partner.

Supply chain diversification, including semiconductors and critical minerals, is where India stands to gain.

India's own stabilisation of ties with China since 2024 fits the same pattern of hedging.